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Recently, a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme based on entanglement swapping, called
measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD), was proposed to bypass all detector side-channel
attacks. While mdiQKD is conceptually elegant and offers a supreme level of security, the experimen-
tal complexity is challenging for practical systems. For instance, it requires interference between two
widely separated independent single-photon sources, and the rates are dependent on detecting two
photons - one from each source. Here we experimentally demonstrate a QKD scheme that removes
the need for a two-photon system and instead uses the idea of a two-qubit single-photon (TQSP) to
significantly simplify the implementation and improve the efficiency of mdiQKD in several aspects.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the ex-
change of cryptographic keys between two separated
users, Alice and Bob, who are connected by a poten-
tially insecure quantum channel [1–4]. Unlike conven-
tional key distribution schemes, the security of QKD de-
pends only on the principles of quantum physics and can
be proven information-theoretically secure. However, de-
spite the potential of QKD, one still has to be prudent
about potential side-channel attacks that may lead to se-
curity failures. For example, it has been shown that with
detector blinding techniques, it is possible to remotely
hack the measurement unit of some QKD systems [5].
Although it is possible to implement appropriate counter-
measures for specific attacks, one may be wary that the
adversary, Eve, could devise new detector control strate-
gies, unforeseen by the users.
To prevent all known and yet-to-be-discovered de-
tector side-channel attacks, a measurement-device-
independent QKD (mdiQKD) protocol was proposed [6].
In this scheme, Alice and Bob each randomly prepare
one of the four Bennett Brassard (BB84) states [1]
and send it to a third party, Charlie, whose role is to
introduce entanglement between Alice and Bob via a
Bell-state measurement (BSM) [7, 8]. Obviously, Alice
and Bob do not have to trust Charlie since any other
non-entangling measurement would necessarily introduce
some noise between them. In practice, mdiQKD can
be implemented with phase-randomized weak coherent
(BB84) states (WCSs), using either time-bin encoded
qubits [9, 10] or polarization-encoded qubits [11, 12]. To
meet the assumption that Alice and Bob send single pho-
tons, as required by mdiQKD, they randomly vary the
intensity of their laser pulses and use the decoy-state
method [13–15] to estimate the fraction of single-photon
states sent to and detected by Charlie.
Unfortunately, mdiQKD possesses many drawbacks.
Firstly, the achievable secure key rates (SKR) are sig-
nificantly lower compared to conventional prepare and
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measure (P&M) QKD systems [16–19]. This is mainly
because a two-photon BSM relies on coincidence detec-
tions, meaning that the SKR scales with (ηdetP1(µ))
2,
where ηdet is the single photon detector (SPD) efficiency
and P1(µ) is the probability of the source emitting a
single-photon [20]. Another factor is that a two-photon
BSM implemented with linear optics is at most 50% ef-
ficient [21–23] and, when using WCSs, the results from
one of the bases cannot be used for the raw-key gener-
ation due to an inherent 25% error rate [9, 11]. Fur-
thermore, the resource overhead in the finite-key sce-
nario [24] is significantly larger compared to common
P&M schemes [19, 25], due to the need to apply the
decoy-state method twice (once for each source), in-
creasing the statistical fluctuations. For example, at
150 km, Alice and Bob would have to send at least
1014 laser pulses to Charlie before key distillation is
possible [24]. Finally, the technological complexity of
mdiQKD is greater due to the use of two-photon inter-
ference, requiring both photons to be indistinguishable
in all degrees of freedom (DOFs): temporal, polarization
and frequency.
Here we report on the implementation of a QKD
scheme that overcomes the aforementioned limitations
but is still secure against all detector side-channel at-
tacks. This bridges the gap between the superior perfor-
mance and practicality of P&M QKD schemes and the
enhanced security offered by mdiQKD. Note that a sim-
ilar scheme, following the same basic idea, has been pro-
posed elsewhere [26]. Our scheme, henceforth referred
to as detector-device-independent QKD (ddiQKD), es-
sentially follows the idea of mdiQKD, however, instead
of encoding separate qubits into two independent pho-
tons, we exploit the concept of a two-qubit single-photon
(TQSP). This scheme has the following advantages: (1)
it requires only single-photon interference, (2) the linear-
optical BSM is 100% efficient [27], (3) the secret key rate
scales linearly with the SPD detection efficiency and (4)
it is expected that in the finite-key scenario the minimum
classical post-processing size is similar to that of P&M
QKD schemes. In the following we outline the main con-
cepts and demostrate a proof-of-principle experiment.
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FIG. 1. The conceptual setup. Alice encodes her qubit |ψA〉p
in the polarization DOF of a single photon, sends it to Bob
who encodes his qubit |ψB〉s in the spatial DOF using a 50/50
beam splitter (BS) and a phase modulator (PM). Bob then
performs a complete and deterministic Bell-State measure-
ment (BSM) on both qubits using a half-wave plate (HWP),
polarizing beam splitters (PBS) and single-photon detectors
(SPDs). Components inside the shaded regions of Alice and
Bob’s labs are trusted devices, whilst the SPDs are untrusted.
The protocol works as follows; see Fig. 1. Alice first
prepares a single photon in the qubit state |ψA〉p chosen
at random from the following set of BB84 states:
|ψA〉p ∈r

|+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉),
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉),
|+i〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ i|V 〉),
|−i〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − i|V 〉),
where the subscript p indicates this is a qubit in the po-
larization DOF of the photon. Alice sends |ψA〉p to Bob
via an untrusted quantum channel. Upon reception of
the photon, Bob encodes his random qubit state |ψB〉s
in the spatial DOF (hence the subscript “s”). To achieve
this, Bob sends the photon to a 50/50 beam splitter (BS).
We denote |u〉 and |`〉 the states of the basis defined by
the “upper” and “lower”arms after the BS, respectively.
He then applies a phase ϕ chosen at random in the set
{0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} on the lower arm to prepare the state
|ψB〉s = (|u〉 + eiϕ|`〉), yielding BB84 states in the spa-
tial modes. Both DOFs have so far been created and
manipulated independently of each other, and thus the
two-qubit state can be written as |ψA〉p ⊗ |ψB〉s.
We then define the following Bell states:
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉p|u〉s ± |V 〉p|`〉s), (1)
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉p|`〉s ± |V 〉p|u〉s). (2)
A complete and deterministic BSM of these states is
realized by first applying the unitary transformation
|Hu〉 → |V u〉 and |V u〉 → |Hu〉 on the upper arm us-
ing a half-wave plate (HWP), followed by recombination
of the arms on a 50/50 BS, and finally by a projection in
the {|H〉, |V 〉} basis using two PBSs on the two output
arms followed by four SPDs. In this way, a click on each
a) |Φ+〉
+ − +i −i
+ 0.49 0.01 0.25 0.26
− 0.01 0.50 0.25 0.27
+i 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.48
−i 0.24 0.23 0.50 0.01
b) |Ψ+〉
+ − +i −i
+ 0.49 0.02 0.25 0.27
− 0.00 0.50 0.27 0.24
+i 0.29 0.23 0.49 0.00
−i 0.23 0.25 0.01 0.55
c) |Ψ−〉
+ − +i −i
+ 0.00 0.48 0.28 0.25
− 0.54 0.00 0.25 0.23
+i 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.52
−i 0.26 0.24 0.50 0.01
d) |Φ−〉
+ − +i −i
+ 0.00 0.47 0.25 0.25
− 0.54 0.00 0.23 0.25
+i 0.26 0.26 0.48 0.00
−i 0.26 0.21 0.00 0.56
TABLE I. Theoretical and experimentally observed probabil-
ities for each Bell state. Rows and columns correspond to
Alice’s and Bob’s states |ψA〉p and |ψB〉s, respectively. Given
a certain Bell state k, for each |ψA〉p there are four possible
|ψB〉s: white cells should happen with probability Pr[k] = 0,
light grey cells with Pr[k] = 1/4 and dark grey cells with
Pr[k] = 1/2. The experimentally observed probabilities are
written in each cell.
SPD corresponds to a projection on one of the four Bell
states; see Fig. 1.
To show how the raw key establishment functions,
let us first define the mutually unbiased bases BX =
{|+〉, |−〉} and BY = {|+i〉, |−i〉}. The bit to be es-
tablished is encoded in Alice’s state, i.e. |+〉 and |+i〉
encode bit 0, and |−〉 and |−i〉 encode bit 1. After the
measurement phase, Bob uses an authenticated channel
to announce the success of the BSM and reveals the ba-
sis he used to encode his qubit. Subsequently, Alice an-
nounces whether Bob’s basis choice was compatible with
hers. Bob can then determine Alice’s bit value accord-
ing to Table I, which shows all of the possible combina-
tions. For example, if |ψB〉s = |+〉, the bit is 0 if he de-
tected |Φ+〉 or |Ψ+〉, and 1 otherwise. If more than one
detector clicked, Bob announces a successful BSM and
assigns a random bit value. Importantly, the knowledge
of the bases used by Alice and Bob, along with which
of the Bell states Bob obtained, does not reveal Alice’s
bit. Hence, Eve does not gain information on the key by
controlling Bob’s detectors.
From a security point of view, it is important to con-
sider carefully the operation of Bob’s device. Strictly
speaking, the mathematical description of his qubit, out-
lined previously, holds only if the light state entering the
first BS is a single-photon excitation of a single optical-
temporal mode. As with any other QKD scheme, it is
not possible to guarantee this. Indeed, Eve may send
multi-photon states through the quantum channel and
break the qubit description. However, such an attack
is only detrimental if she can interact with Bob’s pre-
pared states, for instance, by making unambiguous state
discrimination measurements on them [28]. This is not
possible since the adversary can only interact with Al-
ice’s qubits. Additionally, if the input is a multi-photon
state, with very high probability, more than one detec-
3tor clicks, in which case Bob would pick a random bit
value, increasing the errors in the raw bit string. This is
due to the fact that the optical linear circuit of the BSM
randomizes the encoded state.
The security of our scheme requires that the final light
state (just before the SPDs), taken over all possible en-
coding choices, is independent of the input light state.
In particular, for any input state with a given n-photon
excitation, the average final state after passing through
the linear optical circuit is a fixed state. This require-
ment is in fact similar to the one used in the security
analysis of BB84, where the average of the BB84 states
has to be independent of the basis choice [29]. Once this
requirement is met, the security of the scheme can be
obtained following proof techniques for the BB84 QKD
scheme. A common method to prove the security of P&M
QKD schemes is to consider an equivalent entanglement-
based version, where Alice and Bob make random mea-
surements on bipartite quantum states distributed by the
adversary. To this end, we point to a formalism that
allows us to see Bob’s linear optical circuit as random
measurements made on some entangled bipartite state.
First, let us relate the two different DOFs, i.e. Ap,
Bp denoting the polarization states of Alice and Bob re-
spectively, while Bs denotes Bob’s spatial state. Since
Alice is able to prepare the four polarization BB84 states
correctly, it is equivalent to consider the entanglement
based version, where Alice first prepares a two-qubit
maximally entangled state, |Φ+〉, and then performs a
projective measurement on one half of the state to pre-
pare the other half for Bob. Mathematically, we have,
Mx⊗I|Φ+〉〈Φ+|ApBp⊗|s〉〈s|Bs , where Mx is the positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) element corresponding
to preparation x ∈ {+,−,+i,−i} and |s〉Bs is an auxil-
iary state related to the spatial DOF.
Second, Alice sends the quantum systems Bp and Bs
using a single photon through the quantum channel to
Bob. At this point, the resulting state is not necessarily
a single photon state; it may be a multi-photon state. In
this case, the state, after tracing out system Ap, is de-
scribed by a bipartite density operator, ρCpCs , whose di-
mension is unknown but fixed, i.e. it could be any n-
photon light state. Note that we changed the subscript
B to C to reflect the action of the quantum channel. To
proceed, we use a result from Ref. [30, Lemma. 1], which
says that if, for any input state, the linear optical cir-
cuit (parameterized by ϕ) outputs a state that is fixed
on the average, then the encoding can be seen as a puri-
fied measurement acting on the same input state and one
half of a bipartite pure state, where the other half of the
bipartite is the same output state. More formally, let the
linear optical circuit be described by a set of completely
positive trace-preserving maps, {Eϕ}ϕ, taking the input
quantum system Cs to an output quantum system Ds,
such that for any input quantum state ρCs , the output
quantum state is fixed over all possible encoding choices,
i.e. 1/4
∑
ϕ Eϕ(ρCs) = ρDs for any ρCs . Then, the linear
optical circuit is equivalent to making a joint measure-
FIG. 2. Experimental realization of the ddiQKD proto-
col. Labelled components include, dense wavelength divi-
sion multiplexers (DWDM), bandpass filter (F), waveplates
(WP), Soleil-Babinet compensator (SB), polarization con-
trollers (PC), phase modulator (PM), 50/50 beam splitters
(BS), polarizing beam splitters (PBS) and single-photon de-
tectors (SPD).
ment {FϕCsKs}ϕ on the same input state, ρCs , and one
half of a bipartite pure state, |σ〉KsDs , living in a joint
quantum system Ks ⊗ Ds, where the other half gives
the fixed state ρDs . Therefore, the purification provides
a method to analyze the security of our scheme in an
entanglement-based picture, where Alice makes random
BB84 measurements on one half of a bipartite quantum
state, and Bob makes random purified measurements on
the other half.
Finally, the security of ddiQKD follows directly from
that of the BB84 QKD scheme, with the additional ben-
efit that detectors are excluded from the security analy-
sis. In particular, the security can be obtained by using
the entropic uncertainty relation proof technique [25, 31]:
in the asymptotic limit, and under the approximation
that the BB84 polarization states are prepared correctly,
the secret key fraction is ∝ 1 − 2h(Q), where h is the
binary entropy function and Q is the error rate of the
sifted key. In fact, the finite-key security performance of
ddiQKD is expected to be similar to the one of the single-
photon BB84 [31] since only single-photon detections are
required on Bob’s side. Likewise, for a more practical
implementation using the decoy-state method for WCS,
we expect the security performance to be similar to the
one in Ref. [25].
We implemented a proof-of-principle experiment as il-
lustrated in Fig. 2. We started with the generation
of a pair of correlated photons by type-0 SPDC in a
fiber-pigtailed periodically-poled lithium-niobate waveg-
uide (PPLN-WG) [32]. The waveguide was pumped with
a continuous wave diode laser (Toptica DL100) at 780 nm
and the signal and idler photons were deterministically
separated by dense wavelength division multiplexers at
1563.9 nm (200 GHz) and 1556.6 nm (100 GHz), re-
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FIG. 3. Experimental Bell-state measurement outcomes as a function of the phase setting inside Bob’s interferometer. Four
sets of measurements are shown, one for each of the possible states sent by Alice.
spectively. The idler photon was detected by a free-
running InGaAs single-photon detector (ID Quantique
ID220). The polarization of the heralded signal photon
was set to |+〉 before passing through a Soleil-Babinet,
which allowed us to rotate the state around the equa-
tor of the Bloch sphere and prepare Alice’s single-photon
state. Bob’s device consisted of a balanced interferome-
ter, with a polarization controller in the upper arm act-
ing as a HWP and a piezo phase modulator in the lower
arm. The outputs of the BSM corresponding to |Φ−〉 and
|Ψ−〉 were delayed by 2.5 ns before being combined using
two PBSs (see Fig. 2) with the other two outputs, which
allowed the use of two detectors for all four outcomes.
Bob’s free-running InGaAs SPDs were cooled with a Stir-
ling cooler to −90oC and had a dark count rate of less
than 50 cps at 25% efficiency [33]. The detection events
were recorded by a time-to-digital converter (TDC). The
g(2)(0) of the single photons at Alice was about 10−3 in a
1 ns coincidence window. Due to the extremely low dark
count probability of the InGaAs detectors, the probabil-
ity of having a double detection at Bob was < 10−6.
To analyze the detection outcomes for all combinations
of Alice and Bob’s settings, we fixed the state prepared
by Alice and scanned the phase of Bob’s interferometer.
Figure 3 shows four curves, one for each of the polar-
ization states chosen by Alice, representing the normal-
ized probability of each Bell-state being announced at
any given phase setting in Bob’s interferometer. The
measurement points were fitted in order to calculate the
visibility, with the highest average value obtained being
99.2±1.5% for the |−i〉 input state at Bob and the lowest
value of 96.0 ± 2.1% for the |−〉 state. Table I shows
the theoretical Bell-state announcement probability for
every combination of Alice and Bob’s settings. We com-
plete this correlation table with the experimental results
by selecting points from Fig. 3 closest to the desired set-
tings for Bob. One can see that the experimental values
coincide with the prediction and the overall quantum bit
error rate, Q, was 1.5 ± 0.5%. The total detection rate
was around 60 cps.
While the concept of ddiQKD is fundamentally the
same as mdiQKD, some subtleties need to be pointed
out. For instance, in mdiQKD, Eve can interact with
Alice’s and Bob’s qubits, but in our scheme only with
Alice’s qubit. Furthermore, we extend the trusted device
boundary in Bob’s laboratory to include the linear opti-
cal elements of the BSM, leaving only the single-photon
detectors as untrusted devices. This means that Eve can
have full control over their functionalities, e.g. she can
control the response functions of the detectors [34]. But
Bob can ensure that no additional information, other
than the outcome of the BSM, leaks out of his lab. In-
deed, if Eve had access to the output ports of Bob’s PBSs
she could carry out a Trojan-horse attack [35] in order to
gain information about the phase setting of Bob’s inter-
ferometer. Note that attacks targeting the state prepa-
ration devices are also applicable to mdiQKD, but can
be resolved (see Refs. [26, 36] for further discussion).
In practice, an implementation of ddiQKD using WCSs
together with the decoy-state method could yield SKRs
comparable with existing GHz clocked systems [16–
19]. In particular, ultra-fast generation of polarization
states could be achieved using a birefringence modulator
scheme as used in Ref. [37]. We would like to highlight
that the concept of TQSP entanglement employed in the
ddiQKD scheme can be achieved by using any two DOFs
5of the single-photon. For example, Alice could encode a
time-bin qubit [38] followed by Bob’s addition of a polar-
ization qubit to the same photon.
In summary we implemented a ddiQKD protocol that
overcomes the main disadvantages of the mdiQKD pro-
tocol whilst offering the same level of security. Future
theoretical work should focus on deriving a bound on
the extractable key length in a finite key scenario. This
work paves the way to practical, high-performance and
detector-side-channel free QKD.
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